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Introduction

1
In many systems, the electricity market has evolved to a 2 deregulated market where providers and consumers may be In this market structure, the agents of both sides of supply the power excedence in the market due to their bigger size.
110
The earnings from such market participation must be shared; aging their demand attempt to reduce final electricity price.
158
The proposed structure is shown in Figure 1 . The proposed 159 structure has four stages as follows: Figure 2 illustrates the system under study.
185
The ED under study includes a collection of production and π ES+ ) are summarized in Table 1 .
193
The cost coefficients (a, b, c), profit and the price of power 
Problem formulation
214
In this section, the mathematical formulation of the prob- 
Objective functions and problem constraints
220
The proposed market key components include two players: ) can be defined as: is the PV system output power (kW) and
is the ES discharge power at t th hour (kW).
235
For sake of simplicity, the retail electricity price is consid-
236
ered the same for all the players following a singular distri-
where θ and β are load demand curve coefficient, λ the iden-239 tical electricity price in $/kWh and P n t total ED system given 240 load demand in kW at the t th hour. The cost function (i.e.
241
Player−1 t
) is expressed in $ by.
242
Player−1 t
The generators WT and PV are as non-distributable units been formulated as a quadratic function as follows.
where a, b and c are the coefficients of cost function for MT.
249
The ES charge and discharge costs are also computed through 250 the following relations [24, 25] .
where π ES− and π ES+ are respectively the ES supply price 252 in the charge and discharge modes and P
ES+ t
and P
ES− t
are 253 also the powers of ES charge and discharge modes. is defined as follows:
Each one of the above mentioned players make their deci-259 sions depending on local and global constraints. 
Local and global constraints 261
Equilibrium constraint: the equilibrium of the power gen-262 erated by Player #1 must be equivalent to the total power 263 consumed by load demand satisfying:
Player #1: MT is exploited during the given time t under 265 the following conditions.
where P MT and P MT are respectively the minimum and max- 
where N s is the number of uncertainty scenarios and ρ Load uncertainty can be modelled using normal distribu- 
WT uncertainty modelling 314
Noting that the wind speed is a random variable, calcula- 
321
The wind speed probability distribution curve in this study 
where P the (x 1 , · · · , x i−1 , x i+1 , · · · , x n ) player has adopted the be-375 haviour while the other players i th are present in the game.
376
The Nash equilibrium for each i th player is defined as x = 377 (x 1 , · · · , x n ).
In other words, a Nash equilibrium exists if always for 379 all the players and all the x i holds i ∈ N, Θ i (x i |x )
Noting that the strategies of other players is con- 23. The Nikaido-Isoda function is defined as follows: increase its pay-offs by the unilateral changes of its strategy.
392
One Nash normalized equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium 393 point if: timum response function by using the relaxation algorithm.
where k, is the iteration step and α k is the weight allocated 429 to x k and Z(x k ) is for obtaining new x k+1 in the k next step.
430
The optimum response function, as long as shutdown condi-431 tion is satisfied as follows, is updated repeatedly.
is a small value defined by the user for controlling the 433 convergence rate. The convergence of relaxation algorithm 434 is guaranteed with a constant α k for a convex-concave func-435 tion, when α k satisfies the following conditions.
During each iteration k, an optimum value α k is found 437 through solving the following optimum response function:
After several iterations, the tranquillity algorithm con- 
REM-NIRA algorithm
448
The flowchart for implementing the REM-NIRA algorithm 449 is presented in Figure 6 . As observed in this figure, the algo- space, which significantly reduces the testing burden [32] .
466
For additive and quadratic models, TOAT has been proven to [20] and is outside the scope of this paper. clock. Significant change in its value has not been observed.
544
After this time, if the SOC initial value is set at minimum 545 value (scenario #3), the system will observe sudden decrease each iteration for converging to the Nash equilibrium point.
586
The measure of adequate steps may improve by trial and er-587 ror while its value changes between the interval 0 α 1. In many cases, it has been observed that by using constant 589 step α s = 0.5 it is quickly guided to the convergence value.
590
Although the size of the steps can also be selected by the 
Conclusions
610
In this paper, a method has been proposed for implement-611 ing a market based on a competitive framework by noting 
